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FOREWORD
ALFRED C. YEN *
This symposium arose from collaboration with my fabulous col-
leagues Joe Liu and Larry Cunningham. Things began when Profes-
sor Cunningham, a superb scholar in corporate and business law, con-
sulted Professor Liu and me about an article he was writing entitled
Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Ac-
counting. 1 Among other things, he was curious about the treatment of
copyright claims by private entities in standards that had legal effects.
As Professor Cunningham explained, private entities such as the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "FASB") author account-
ing standards to which auditors are legally required to adhere. The
FASB claims copyright in these standards, a perfectly understandable
position given well-established lenient standards for granting copy-
right. 2 These claims could, however, become controversial when an
institution like the FASB uses that copyright to extract rent from those
merely trying to conform to the standard. For example, an auditing
firm might want to make copies of the FASB standards for distribution
to its auditing staff. If the FASB were to prevail in a claim that such
copying amounted to infringement, auditors would have to pay mo-
nopoly prices for the "privilege" of having a copy of the FASB's stan-
dards to read.
Professor Liu and I both study intellectual property, and we had
often spoken about the challenges associated with the private owner-
ship of standards, particularly with respect to technology. We were
aware of cases involving legal standards, but we did not realize that
these intellectual property issues were a "big deal" to people studying
corporate law. When Professor Cunningham confirmed to us that de-
bates about standards were important in his field, the idea for this
* Professor of Law, Law School Fund Scholar, and Director, Emerging Enterprises and
Business Law Program, Boston College Law School.
I The article, which 1 highly recommend, is published at 104 Mien. L. Rtiv. 291
(2005).
2 Sre Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Set - v. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (noting that,
generally, the copyright prerequisite of originality is a standard easily met, although an
alphabetical compilation of telephone numbers failed to meet the standard): Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 244 (1903) (expressing reluctance to deny
copyright to a work simply because it lacks strong aesthetic merit).
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symposium emerged. If intellectual property, antitrust, and corporate
law scholars all think and write about standards, why not have them
present their ideas together so that their diverse perspectives could be
shared? We agreed that such a symposium would be both interesting
and valuable, and proceeded to make plans.
And so it was that on March 31, 2006, some of the country's finest
scholars gathered at Boston College Law School to present and dis-
cuss the articles that follow. Individually, these articles are excellent
pieces of scholarship. Together, they offer nuanced and sophisticated
perspectives that broaden and strengthen our understanding of the
problems associated with owning standards.
More than anything, these articles teach us that there are many
ways in which standards can be "owned" and exploited. People can
own standards by having property rights in them or by controlling
their development and content. Both types of ownership show us that
society must think carefully about how best to generate standards.
Standards confer external benefits, but who will create standards if
those benefits cannot be internalized? And, if standard setting re-
quires collective action, who will take up that labor if those acting col-
lectively become vulnerable to litigation from those unhappy with the
standards set?
The attempts to answer questions like these become fascinatingly
complex. From Mark Lemley and Herbert Hovenkamp, we learn that
property rights in standards can create financial incentives to gener-
ate standards, and the astute application of antitrust laws can shield
standard setters from vexatious litigation. 4
 These incentives, however,
3
 The first panel of the symposium was entitled -Technology Standards," and was
moderated by Joe Liu of Boston College Law School. Mark Lemley of Stanford Law School
presented a paper, and Herbert Hovenkamp of the University of Iowa College or Law was
scheduled to present a paper but was absent because of illness; Stacey Dogan of Northeast-
ern Law School presented Professor flovenkamp's paper on his behalf and led the subse-
quent commentary. 1 was the moderator of the second panel, entitled 'Government and
Private Adoption of Standards." William Bratton of Georgetown University Law Center and
A. Michael Froomkin of the University of Miami School of Law presented papers; Sidney
Shapiro of Wake Forest University School of Law led the commentary I also moderated
the third panel, entitled "Standards and the Economy." F. Scott KiefT and Frank Partnoy
presented papers, and Lawrence Cunningham led the subsequent commentary. The final
panel was entitled "Opportunistic Behavior mid Standards,' and was moderated by Joe Liu.
Pamela Samuelson of the University of California at Berkeley School of Law and Greg
Vetter of the University of Houston Law Center presented papers; Michael Carroll of VII-
lanova University School of Law led the subsequent commentary,
' 4 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C.
L. REV. 87 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things.
 to the About Patent Holdup of Standards (and
One Nut to), 48 B,C. L. Rix. 149 (2007),
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also raise the possibility of socially undesirable behavior by standard
setters. Pam Samuelson shows us how some standard owners try to
extract monopoly rents or prevent competitors from entering the
market. 6 Greg Vetter explains how certain participants in standard
setting try to frame standards to gain lasting competitive advantages
over rivals. 6 And, as Frank . Partnoy describes, those with control over
standards face moral hazards and conflicts of interest that threaten
the public welfare.?
The articles published here show that many solutions to these
problems are possible. Mark Lemley and Pam Samuelson discuss why
society should consider limiting or even denying intellectual property
rights in standards. 8 At the same time, Herbert Hovenkamp explores
the proper purposes and limits of antitrust to remind us that law can-
not fix all of the problems associated with standard setting. 9 Indeed,
many of the articles review how wise private ordering may be enough
to diminish incentives for antisocial behavior by standard setters or
owners. For example, William Bratton describes how the FASB's de-
sign lessens the danger of capture and contributes to the independent
design of reasonable accounting standards.° Similarly, Mark Lemley,
Scott Kieff, and Troy Paredes suggest how proper structuring of pri-
vate entities can increase the likelihood that people will contribute
constructively to standard-setting efforts instead of gaming the system
for rent. 11 Greg Vetter analyzes how open source licensing can defeat
opportunistic behavior by making it hard for people to hide the de-
. tails of what they have done. 12 Finally, Michael Froomkin offers a most
intriguing case for using the opportunistic desires of standards users
to achieve important public objectives. 13
5 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193
(2007).
6 See generally Greg R. Vetter, Open Sourre Licensing and Scattering Opportunism in Software
Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225 (2007).
7 See generally Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169
(2007).
8 See generally Lensley, supra note 4; Samuelson, .supra note 5.
9 See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 4.
to See generally William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. R•v. 5 (2007).
" See generally Bratton, supra note 10; F. Scott Kieft & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a
Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. Rt:v. 111
(2007); Lemley, supra note 4.
12 See generally Vetter, supra note 6.
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In closing, I would like to give special thanks to those whose sup-
port for this symposium has been invaluable. The symposium's au-
thors and commentators deserve special recognition for their insight
and willingness to trade ideas with those at the symposium. The Boston
College Law Review's entire staff, particularly Matt McGinnis, Kristie
Tappan, David Cohen, and Luke Scheuer, have gone the extra mile to
organize symposium events, edit the articles, and keep the publication
schedule moving. Boston College Law School, particularly Dean John
Garvey, supported the symposium financially directly and through the
work of our Emerging Enterprises and Business Law Program. Finally,
once again, I must thank Joe Liu and Larry Cunningham. Without
their insight and colleagueship, none of this would have happened.
